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Much of the scholarly literature on democracy in the European Union (EU) 
assumes that national publics are apathetic toward EU affairs (Moravcsik 2002, 
Habermas 2001, Hoskyns and Newman 2000, Schmitter 2000, Siedentop 2000).  This 
literature relies on the elections to the European Parliament (EP) as evidence for such 
claims. Average EU voter turnout has steadily declined since 1979.
1 However, national 
publics have demonstrated an interest in EU governance.  Both the Danish and Irish 
publics stalled integration through failed referendums on the Treaty on the European 
Union (1992) and the Treaty of Nice (2000). The recent French and Dutch public 
referendums halted efforts to create a European Constitution. These referendums inspired 
much higher turnout than the EP elections. If public apathy explained the problems with 
EP elections, then voters should also have stayed home during these referendums.  
Several studies suggest that EP elections serve as second-order contests. Voters 
utilize these elections to rate the performance of national governments. National parties 
rely on these elections to determine their levels of public support.  Campaigns focus on 
conflicts and issues relevant to the national arena. The elections become forums for 
national issues and lose any relevance for EU governance. This argument assumes that 
the public remains apathetic toward the EU. Voters either neglect the EU altogether or 
subordinate EU concerns to national agendas. Empirical studies of this argument neglect 
the motivations behind voter choices. While the second-order theory makes assumptions 
about voters’ motivations, the existing evidence only demonstrates patterns in voting 
behavior. Voters may support alternative parties in EP elections because of different 
concerns and agendas at the EU level. They may defect to send signals to national 
                                                 
1 Turnout was 63% in ’79, 61% in ’84, 58.5% in ’89, 56.8% in ’94, 49.8% in ’99 and 45.7% in ’04 (EOS 
Gallup Europe 2004). 
  2governments on their performance at the European level. These expectation lead to the 
central question of this paper: What motivates voter choices in EP elections?  
This paper hypothesizes that both national and supranational politics influence the 
voters’ choices in EP elections. The EU has varying effects on the politics and 
governance in the member states. Some member states have had to adopt extensive 
reforms to uphold the legal and institutional requirements of EU membership. National 
elections should thus address European matters. Indeed, Schmitter (2003) argues that 
voters utilize national elections to pressure national governments on European issues. 
National elections emphasize both national and European issues. EP elections should 
exhibit a similar pattern. National concerns should not exclusively dictate EP election 
results. Voters will use their votes to evaluate government performance on both national 
and European issues. Both dimensions should exert influence on voter choices in EP 
elections.  
The argument has several implications for EU studies. At the micro level, it 
demonstrates a public interest in the EU and disputes the conventional wisdom that the 
public neither cares nor understands the European Union. Citizens may utilize EP 
elections to send cues to national parties, but they also possess an interest in EU affairs. 
Public apathy does not explain the low voter turnout in EP elections. At the macro level, 
it indicates a basic problem with EU democracy. Several scholars argue that elites have a 
“permissive consensus” to make decisions at the EU level. EU critics maintain that the 
EU lacks such legitimacy and suffers from a ‘democracy deficit.’ This paper confirms 
some of the assumptions behind the deficit argument. Publics take an interest in the EU 
and thus require forums to participate in EU governance and to facilitate government 
  3accountability. EP elections serve none of the traditional functions of elections if they 
serve solely as barometers on national issues. Additionally, if voters use EP elections to 
signal displeasure with national governments for their actions at the European level, then 
elites should not assume they have a permissive consensus.  
This paper builds on the EP election literature by exploring the motivations 
behind EP voters. It also contributes to the growing body of literature on multi-level 
governance. Several scholars examine the effect of interactions between local, regional, 
national and supranational levels of governance on EU governance. This paper indicates 
the relationship between multi-level governance and elections, as national governments 
must perform at multiple levels in order to secure popular support. 
Second-Order Elections 
  Reif and Schmitt (1980) first classified elections according to their importance to 
voters. They classified national-level elections as first-order and local-level elections as 
second-order. Both publics and parties interpret second-order elections as inconsequential 
compared to first-order elections. This perceived irrelevance has many consequences for 
second-order elections. First, the apparent insignificance of these elections will reduce 
the expected benefits from participation. As such, second-order elections will suffer from 
dramatically lower turnout than first-order elections. Second, as the public devotes 
substantially more attention to issues from first-order elections, these issues will 
dominate second-order elections. Finally, second-order may become barometers of 
support for national governments. National governments remain intact despite the results 
of second-order elections. Supporters of national governments may then vote for different 
parties as their choice will not ultimately damage the capabilities of the government. 
  4These voters would intend for such defections to send messages of dissatisfaction to 
national parties.  Reif and Schmitt attribute many of the perceived failings of EP elections 
to their second-order status.    
Several scholars concur with this reasoning. Franklin (2001) argues that national 
parties regard EP elections as opportunities to gauge public opinion on national issues or 
to mobilize voters. He relies on survey data to demonstrate that EP voters would have 
supported different parties in national elections. Hix (1997) asserts that “national party 
leaders, particularly in opposition, will use European elections as a chance to voice a 
protest against governing parties” (4). Candidates promote national issues, opponents 
rarely express differences on European issues and campaigns neglect Euro-issues. 
Schmitter (2000) asserts that this environment produces elections in which “voters are 
simply not offered an opportunity to choose between rival partisan elites presenting 
alternative programs at that level of aggregation” (7). While these scholars largely 
conjecture on EP elections, several studies have employed empirical methodology to 
build on Reif and Schmitt’s argument.  
Anderson and Ward (1996) develop a framework to investigate the conditions for 
government performance in barometer elections. They assume that parties in power will 
lose support in such election and seek to explain variations in such losses. Their 
framework incorporates variables for economic performance, executive popularity, 
partisanship in the electorate, prior performance of the parties in power and time. They 
find that the timing of barometer elections determines the extent of government losses. 
Governments perform better the further the elections are from the midpoint of the 
electoral cycle. Additionally, while economic variables appear irrelevant, political 
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popularity contests and reflections of the political mood of the moment than opportunities 
to reward and punish incumbent governments for economic performance” (457).  
  Hug and Sciarini (2000) examine the effect of institutions on voting behavior in 
referendums on European integration. They discover that voters act according to the 
expected consequences for the party in power. Government supporters defect from their 
party line only if they believe such a defection will not harm their party. Both of these 
studies support the barometer theory. However, neither study indicates that these 
barometers neglect EU concerns. Hug and Sciarini suggest that European concerns 
motivate voters in their choices in referendums. Anderson and Ward argue government 
popularity does not rely on performance in a particular policy area. Thus, these elections 
may serve equally as barometers for government agendas at the European and national 
levels.   
  Marsh (1998) conducted a study of EP elections between 1979 and 1994. He 
confirms that governments lose more support in EP elections than in general elections. 
This trend especially typifies those countries with more frequent alternation of parties in 
government. He concludes that “European Parliament elections take place within a wider 
political context and that their results can be understood in such terms” (606). While 
Marsh believes this conclusion belies Reif and Schmitt’s claims, it actually indicates a 
potentially erroneous assumption in the second-order theory. The second-order theory 
presumes that the national context dominates the entirety of European politics. However, 
if one envisions European elections in a wider political context, then the concerns at any 
level of governance may influence outcomes at another level of governance. National 
  6issues may influence EP election outcomes, but European issues may also influence 
national election outcomes. Further, concerns at both levels of governance may interact to 
determine outcomes in both national and EP elections.  
Analysis of the Second-Order Theory 
  It is important to note the conceptual foundations of Reif and Schmitt’s argument. 
EU observers might contend that EP elections suffer from low turnout because of the 
institutional balance of power in the EU. The European Parliament has gained decision-
making powers over the last two decades, but it remains the most insignificant of the 
three EU institutions (Nugent 2005). Additionally, Simon Hix (2002) has demonstrated 
that national party positions dictate the voting behavior of members of the European 
Parliament (MEP). The EP may not possess the autonomy to effectively represent the 
public interest. Thus, negative perceptions of the EP could explain the low turnout. If the 
public interprets the EP as an irrelevant institution, then they might abstain from the EU 
election process. Such perceptions may also explain the second-order status of EP 
elections. If the public interprets the EP as a powerless institution, then they may utilize 
EP elections as barometers for national political parties. Neither of these hypotheses 
conforms to Reif and Schmitt’s argument. Reif and Schmitt contend that the level of 
governance (local, national or supranational) determines the public interest in the 
elections, rather than the characteristics of the institutions at any of the levels. Thus, the 
EP could possess more powers, but the voters would still focus on national-level concerns 
in European elections.  
European publics prioritize national politics because they neither understand nor 
take an interest in the EU. The second-order theory thus conforms to prevalent 
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includes a multitude of actors and procedures. Schmitter (2000) argues that “the existing 
rules are virtually unintelligible even to experts, much less citizens” (81). Andrew 
Moravcsik (2002) contends that the EU governs policy areas that fail to stimulate public 
interest. Monetary policy and trade harmonization lack the visibility of education, social 
welfare and national defense.  As such, he claims that the “lack of salience, not lack of 
opportunity, explains why European citizens fail to exploit even the limited opportunities 
they have to participate” (616). These arguments reinforce Reif and Schmitt’s 
explanation for low turnout. Publics disregard EU issues and either abstain from EP 
elections or utilize these elections to focus on national agendas. However, a growing 
body of research disputes this line of reasoning. 
Carruba (2001) maintains that the appearance of public disinterest merely 
indicates that policy-makers are adhering to public preferences on the EU.  Gabel (2000) 
claims “as integration has progressed, these policies have increasingly involved issues of 
high salience to EU citizens” (55). As citizens increasingly observe the consequences of 
the single currency, common defense initiatives and immigration policies, the EU could 
witness a shift in perceptions that it is a distant and trivial body. The recent referendums 
verify such a shift and other studies conclude the public has begun to form opinions on 
EU issues and European integration. Schmitter (2003) observes that the EU increasingly 
influences national elections and popular support for national parties. Ferrara and 
Weishaupt (2004) conclude that both national and European parties suffer if they fail to 
articulate positions on the EU. Tillmann (2004) argues that these positions affect popular 
support: “increasing distance between a citizen and a party on the question of EU 
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literature provides reasons to assume EU issues have relevance in EP elections.  
  Second-order arguments may have overlooked this argument because it neglects 
to analyze voter motivations at the individual level. The second-order literature has 
established that large parties and parties in power lose support in EP elections and re-gain 
support in general elections. However, these studies rarely move beyond this initial step 
to examine the motivations behind EP voter choice and thus explain such patterns. Hix 
and Schmitter only conjecture on trends in EP elections. Reif and Schmitt’s model does 
not address individual choices. Franklin establishes this pattern, but does not employ 
empirical evidence to demonstrate his explanation. Marsh examines changes in party 
support as a function of time intervals between EP and general elections.  
  EP elections may serve as barometers, but this function does not define EP 
elections as second-order. The EU represents a multi-level system of governance. It is 
feasible that voters would hold a government accountable for its actions at multiple 
levels. This possibility seems likely with national governments in EP elections, as 
national governments undertake many actions at the transnational level. Such an 
environment, where voters direct their attention at national parties rather than European 
actors, would produce the appearance of second-order EP elections. However, voters 
would not actually be subordinating European concerns to national agendas. To establish 
EP elections as second-order, the literature must determine that European concerns bear 
minimal influence on voter choices. Anderson and Ward actually incorporate several 
variables (economic performance, executive approval and partisan support) that could 
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evaluations of government support at the national and European levels.  
Hypotheses 
  To test the multi-level model, this paper hypothesizes: evaluations of party 
performance at both the national and European levels influences the total support for 
those parties across EP and national elections (H1). To test the assumptions of second-
order barometer theories, this paper hypothesizes: negative evaluations of government 
performance at the national level most influence voters’ decisions to defect in European 
elections (H2). To test the EU’s effect on such defections, this paper hypothesizes: 
negative evaluations of government performance at the EU level most influence voters’ 
decisions to defect in EP elections (H3). Following the logic that both national and 
European concerns influence voter choices, declining evaluations of government 
performance at both the national and European levels decline should lead to more voter 
defections. Such findings would refute the assumption of the second-order literature that 
voters act exclusively on national concerns in EP elections.   
Data and Methods 
This paper offers three models to investigate the influence of European concerns 
on voting behavior in national and European elections. All three analyses rely on survey 
data from the 1999 European Election Study
2. The first model examines the influence of 
                                                 
2 The data utilized in this paper were originally collected for the European Election Study Workgroup, 
consisting of Cees van der Eijk, Klaus Schoenbach, Hermann Schmitt, Holli Semetko, Wouter van der 
Brug, Mark Franklin, Sören Holmberg, Renato Mannheimer, Jacques Thomassen and Berhanrd Wessels. 
Fieldwork was carried out by a consortium of European survey organizations, co-ordinated by IPSOS 
(Hamburg, GFR). This study has been made possible with grants from the University of Amsterdam, the 
Dutch National Science Foundation (NWO, the Netherlands), The Bundespresseamt (Bonn, GFR), the CIS 
(Madrid, Spain), the University of Mannheim, the ISPO Institute (Milan, Italy) and Trinity College 
(Hartford. Conn., USA). Neither the original collectors of the data nor their sponsors bear any 
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models study voters’ motivations for maintaining support for the same party across 
national and EP elections.  
The sample for the first model includes all of the respondents in the Election 
Study, with the exception of those cases that contain missing values for any of the 
relevant variables. For each country, the authors determined the ‘governing parties,’ those 
parties that were participating in national-level coalition governments at the time of the 
1999 EP elections. Each individual was coded according to their support for governing 
parties in national and European elections. The independent variables are the 
respondents’ national and European concerns. National concerns are measured by 
respondents’ reported approval of their government’s performance. The Election Study 
codes ‘disapproval’ as 1 and ‘approval’ as 2. The variable is recoded in the model as 0 for 
‘disapproval’ and 1 for ‘approval.’ European concerns are measured by examining 
respondents’ reported satisfaction with their government’s policy on European 
integration. The Election Study asks respondents to classify their satisfaction on a four-
point scale. It codes ‘very dissatisfied’ as 1, ‘somewhat dissatisfied’ as 2, ‘somewhat 
satisfied’ as 3 and ‘very satisfied’ as 4.  
Results 
The multi-level model expects that both national and European concerns influence 
the party support of respondents. Respondents that  approve of government performance 
should support government parties in general elections and be more likely to support 
government parties in EP elections. Respondents that disapprove of government 
                                                                                                                                                 
responsibility for the analyses or interpretations published here. The data are distributed by Steinmetz 
Archive, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and associated data-archives. 
  11performance should demonstrate the same tendencies for opposition parties. As evidence 
of European concerns, respondents should be more likely to support government parties 
as they become more satisfied with their government’s policy toward the European 
Union. This analysis employs a probit analysis of the likelihood that the respondent will 
vote for the governing party in the EP election.   
According to hypothesis 1, both levels of policy should have an impact on an 
individual’s likelihood to vote for the government party.  Our primary variables of 
interest are the respondent’s approval of national policy and approval of European policy.  
A dummy variable for whether the respondent voted for the governing party as well as a 
set of dummy variables for country has been included as controls in the model.   Even 
after controlling for these factors, both national approval and European approval have a 
positive, substantively and statistically significant effect on the likelihood that voters will 
choose to vote for the governing party in EU elections.  Not surprisingly, the strongest 
predictor is whether the individual voted for the governing party in the previous national 
election.  While the coefficient for European policy is less than half the size of the 
coefficient for national policy, it is important to note that that European policy varies 
from 1 to 4 while national policy varies from 0 to 1, so the size of the two measures’ 
effects on the predicted probability are similar.    
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Table 1: Determinants of EU Vote for Governing Party 
     
   Vote for Governing Party in EU Elections 
     
Voted for Government Party in National Election  2.622** 
   (0.053) 
Approval of National Policy  0.168** 
   (0.057) 
Approval of European Policy  0.075* 
   (0.036) 
Belgium 0.324** 
   (0.123) 
Denmark 0.135 
   (0.094) 
Germany 0.246** 
   (0.092) 
Greece -0.120 
   (0.131) 
Spain 0.022 
   (0.099) 
France 0.445** 
   (0.135) 
Ireland -0.281* 
   (0.114) 
Luxembourg 0.437** 
   (0.166) 
Netherlands 0.280** 
   (0.101) 
Portugal 0.264 
   (0.151) 
United Kingdom  -0.039 
   (0.125) 
Finland 0.035 
   (0.154) 
Sweden -0.051 
   (0.152) 
Austria 0.207 
   (0.130) 
Constant -1.876** 
   (0.094) 
Observations 5740 
Standard errors in parentheses    
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%    
 
  13The remaining two analyses split the sample in order to examine those who voted 
for governing parties separately from those who supported opposition parties.  Table 2 
models the factors that explain why voters who support the governing party in national 
elections choose to defect and support the opposition party in EP elections.  The model 
shown in Table 2 most directly addresses the barometer conception of EP elections.  Only 
those voters who supported the governing party in national elections are included in the 
sample.  The dependent variable is whether the respondent said he or she would vote for 
the governing party in the EP elections (0=vote for governing party, 1=defect to 
opposition party).  As in Table 1, the primary variables of interest are the respondent’s 
approval of national and EU policy.   
The coefficients for national policy and European policy indicate that higher 
levels of approval are associated with a lower likelihood that the respondent will defect 
from the governing party.  Unlike Table 1, the coefficient for national policy is small and 
statistically insignificant.  The coefficient for European policy is strong and statistically 
significant.  Given the fact that the coefficient for national policy is not statistically 
significant, the evidence in Table 2 does not support the idea that EP elections are 
second-order, barometer elections.  Instead, the strongest indicator of whether a supporter 
of the governing party will support that party in EP elections is that respondent’s degree 
of approval for EU policy.   
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Table 2:  Likelihood of Defection among those who Voted for Government in 
National Election 
     
   Probability of defection from National Vote 
     
Approval of National Policy  -0.094 
   (0.091) 
Approval of European Policy  -0.121* 
   (0.056) 
Belgium -1.109** 
   (0.313) 
Denmark -0.653** 
   (0.160) 
Germany -0.834** 
   (0.155) 
Greece -0.446* 
   (0.186) 
Spain -0.448** 
   (0.131) 
France -1.144** 
   (0.227) 
Ireland 0.121 
   (0.133) 
Luxembourg -0.653** 
   (0.234) 
Netherlands -0.597** 
   (0.146) 
Portugal -1.071** 
   (0.260) 
United Kingdom  -0.406* 
   (0.185) 
Finland -0.402* 
   (0.187) 
Sweden -0.264 
   (0.219) 
Austria -0.486** 
   (0.162) 
Constant -0.389* 
   (0.157) 
Observations 2277 
Standard errors in parentheses    
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%    
 
  15The third model is similar to that shown in Table 2, but it is performed on the 
sample excluded in Table 2.  Instead of modeling the behavior of those who support the 
governing party in national elections, the sample is restricted to those who voted for the 
opposition in national elections, and the focus is on the factors that cause voters who 
voted for the opposition in national elections to vote for governing parties in EP 
elections.  Therefore, defections are votes for the governing party.   
Interestingly, the results shown in Table 3 are the opposite of those shown in 
Table 2.  While European policy was most important in predicting defections from 
governing parties in national elections to opposition parties in EP elections, national 
policy approval is the most important variable for explaining defections from opposition 
parties in national elections to governing parties in EP elections.  The positive and 
statistically significant coefficient for approval of national policy indicates that those who 
approve of national policy are more likely to defect from opposition parties and vote for 
governing parties in EP elections.  The coefficient for approval of national policy is very 
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Table 3:  Likelihood of Defection among those who Voted for Opposition in National 
Election 
     
   Probability of Defection from National Vote 
     
Approval of National Policy  0.214** 
   (0.075) 
Approval of European Policy  0.047 
   (0.049) 
Belgium -0.026 
   (0.149) 
Denmark -0.221 
   (0.125) 
Germany -0.209 
   (0.133) 
Greece -0.810** 
   (0.276) 
Spain -0.458** 
   (0.176) 
France -0.246 
   (0.241) 
Ireland -0.192 
   (0.186) 
Luxembourg 0.280 
   (0.223) 
Netherlands 0.031 
   (0.139) 
Portugal -0.795* 
   (0.387) 
United Kingdom  -0.424* 
   (0.189) 
Finland -0.412 
   (0.322) 
Sweden -0.296 
   (0.213) 
Austria -0.010 
   (0.217) 
Constant -1.607** 
   (0.120) 
Observations 3463 
Standard errors in parentheses    
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barometers on the performance of parties in power.  The sample is comprised of those EP 
voters who reported they would vote for the governing party if elections to their national 
parliament were held the following day. The governing party is defined as the party in 
power at the time of the 1999 EP elections. Election Study codes for the parties in power 
were used to identify and disaggregate supporters of such parties. The resulting sample 
size is approximately 2000 cases.  
There are several reasons to limit the sample in this manner. While it would be 
useful to examine defections from opposition parties, the Election Study does not assess 
public satisfaction with the agendas of such parties. Additionally, the role of opposition 
parties differs between the EU and national politics. At the national level, opposition 
parties may significantly influence public support for the government and the party 
system. At the EU-level, opposition parties only exercise influence through the EP. 
Governments, in contrast, participate in the European Council, the Council of Ministers 
and the EP and appoint the members of the College of Commissioners. The capabilities 
and strategies of governing parties should more substantially influence public satisfaction 
with government performance at the EU level. Finally, Reif and Schmitt, as well as 
Marsh, theorize that parties in power suffer the most losses in second-order elections. 
Supporters of opposition parties encounter different consequences for defections and are 
thus less likely to rely on such a strategy.  
The dependent variable is defined as the likelihood that respondents supported a 
party other than the governing party in the 1999 elections. The Election Study invites 
respondents to identify the party they voted for in the 1999 EP elections and the party 
  18they would vote for if elections to their country’s parliament were held the next day. 
Defections are thus input as a dichotomous variable: respondents who reportedly defected 
from the party in power in the EP elections were entered as 1, while respondents who 
maintained support for the party in power were entered as 0.  
Both analyses rely on the same measures of European and national concerns for 
independent variables. The second analysis also controls for partisanship. Respondents 
indicated if they felt close to a particular party and then qualified the strength of that 
connection. The control variable is coded with a 0 for no connection, a 1 for ‘merely a 
sympathizer,’ a 2 for ‘fairly close,’ and a 3 for ‘very close.’ The paper relies on a probit 
analysis to determine the effects of each of these three variables on the probability that a 
voter will defect in the EP elections.  
Barometer theories would expect dissatisfaction with the government to produce 
defections. Second-order arguments stipulate that such defections occur because of 
dissatisfaction at the national level. The multi-level model, in contrast, predicts that 
defections result from dissatisfaction with policies at both the national and European 
levels. Thus, as respondents indicate less satisfaction with both European and national 
policies, they should be more likely to defect in EP elections. If perceptions of the EP 
lead to defections, then the likelihood of defections should increase with declining 
support for the EU.  
Conclusions 
  The results of the analyses indicate that the public takes an interest in governance 
at the EU level. Government policies on the EU factor into the decisions of EP voters. 
While these results may have limited application, as they only concern individuals that 
  19participate in EP elections, they demonstrate an EU aspect to voter choices in European 
elections. This evidence refutes claims that European citizens remain apathetic toward the 
EU, regardless of their participation in EP elections. Second-order theory presumes that 
low turnout in EP elections results from the EU’s negligible appeal to the public. To 
effectively investigate this claim, future research will also have to analyze attitudes of 
individuals who abstain from EP elections. However, as EU issues are not simply 
‘second-order’ for EP voters, there is reason to suspect some other cause of the low voter 
turnout in EP elections.  
  This paper investigates an alternative explanation for low turnout: perceived 
irrelevance of the EP.  To determine attitudes toward the EP, the analysis relies on a 
measure of opinions on EU membership. Unfortunately, the European Election Study 
does not include a question that might reliably capture perceptions of the EP. Thus, while 
the analysis indicates an insignificant relationship between this variable and defections, it 
does not offer confirmation that the powers of the EP have influenced voter choices. 
Future studies should incorporate a more reliable measure of EP perceptions and, again, 
should determine such perceptions for the voting and non-voting publics.  
  The different analyses lead to mixed conclusions on the role of national issues in 
EP elections. The first analysis demonstrates that national concerns influence voter 
choices more than EU concerns. The second analysis does not find a significant 
relationship between national concerns and voter defections. One explanation is that 
whereas the first analysis undertakes a broader examination of choices across national 
and EP elections, the second analysis focuses on defections in EP elections. As this 
second analysis exclusively examines EU-level behavior, one might expect national 
  20concerns to play a smaller role in voter choices. However, these results may simply result 
from the nature of the national variable. Prior studies confirm the first analysis; national 
concerns influence voter choices.  
  This paper demonstrates that the EU also influences voter choices. EU issues 
interact with national concerns to influence election outcomes. This interaction should 
increasingly shape elections as the public continues to scrutinize EU activities. The EU 
has become a more visible entity over the last 20 years, as it has assumed control over 
policy areas that have direct effects on the lives of the European publics. While it may be 
entering another period of stalled integration, its recent advances will likely continue to 
be subject to public inquiry. Indeed, the failures of referendums on the EU Constitution 
may be due to public concern over the pace of European integration. As such, the EU will 
likely effect national elections and national factors will exert pressure on EU-level 
politics. Scholarship on EP elections will require models that account for interactions 
between national and European levels of governance. 
  
  21Bibliography 
Anderson, Christopher J. and Daniel S. Ward. 1996. “Barometer Elections in  
Comparative Perspective” Electoral Studies. 15(4): 447-460.  
 
Bergman, Torbjörn and Tapio Raunio. 2001. “Parliaments and policy-making in the  
European Union.” In Jeremy Richardson (Ed.) European Union Power and 
policy-making.115-134. London, England: Routledge. 
 
Carrubba, Clifford J. 2001. “The Electoral Connection in European Union Politics” The  
Journal of Politics. 63(1): 141-158.  
 
EOS Gallup Europe. 2004. “Post European elections 2004 survey” Flash Eurobarometer  
162.  
 
European Election Study Research Group. 2002. “European Election Study 1999”  
  Amsterdam, Steinmetz Archive / SWIDOC 
 
Ferrara, Federico and J. Timo Weishaupt. 2004. “Get Your Act Together: Party  
Performance in European Parliament Elections” European Union Politics. 5(3): 
283-306. 
 
Franklin, Mark. 2001. “European elections and the European voter.” In Jeremy  
Richardson (ed.) European Union Power and policy-making. 201-216. London, 
England: Routledge. 
 
Gabel, Mathew and Simon Hix. 2002. “Defining the EU Political Space: An Empirical  
Study of the European Elections Manifestos, 1979-1999” Comparative Political 
Studies. 35(8): 934-964.  
 
Gabel, Mathew. 2000. “European Integration, Voters and National Politics” West  
European Politics. 23(4): 52-72. 
 
Gabel, Matthew. 1998. “Public Support for European Integration: An Empirical Test of  
Five Theories” The Journal of Politics. 60(2): 333-354. 
 
Habermas, Jurgen. 2001. “So, Why Does Europe Need a Constitution?” Translated by  
Michelle Everson, Birkbeck College, University of London. Downloaded from the 
European University Institute: Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies. 
Available at http://www.iue.it/RSC/Treaties.html
 
Hoskyns, Catherine and Michael Newman. 2000. Democratizing the European Union:  
Issues for the twenty-first century. Manchester, England: Manchester University 
Press. 
 
Hix, Simon. 2002. “Parliamentary Behavior with Two Principals: Preferences, Parties,  
  22and Voting in the European Parliament” American Journal of Political Science. 
46(3): 688-698.  
 
Hix, Simon. 1997. “Executive Selection in the European Union: Does the Commission  
President Invesiture Procedure Reduce the Democracy Deficit?” European 
Integration online Papers (EIoP). 1(21): http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-
021a.htm
 
Hug, Simon and Pascal Sciarini. 2000. “Referendums on European Integration: Do  
Institutions Matter in Voter’s Decisions?” Comparative Political Studies. 33(1): 
3-36.  
 
Marsh, Michael. 1998. “Testing the Second-Order Election Model after Four European  
Elections” British Journal of Political Science. 28(4): 591-607.  
 
Moravcsik, Andrew. 2002. “In Defense of the ‘Democracy Deficit’: Reassessing  
Legitimacy in the European Union” Journal of Common Market Studies. 40(4): 
603-624.  
 
Nugent, Neill. 2004. The Government and Politics of the European Union (5
th ed.)  
Hampshire, England: Palgrave.  
 
Reif, Karlheinz and Hermann Schmitt. 1980. “Nine Second Order National Elections: A  
Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results” European 
Journal of Political Research. 8:3-44.  
 
Schmitter, Philippe C. 2003. “Making Sense of the EU: Democracy in Europe and  
Europe’s Democratization” Journal of Democracy. 14(4): 71-85.  
 
Schmitter, Philippe C. 2000. How to Democratize the European Union...And Why  
Bother? New York, New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.  
 
Siedentop, Larry. 2000. Democracy in Europe. London, England: Penguin Books.  
 
Tillmann, Erik R. 2004. “The European Union at the Ballot Box? European Integration  
and Voting Behavior in the New Member States” Comparative Political Studies. 
37(5): 590-610. 
  
  23